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Order Submission Strategy and the Curious 
Case of Marketable Limit Orders 
Mark Peterson and Erik Sirri* 
Abstract 
We provide mpirical evidence on order submission strategy of investors with similar com- 
mitments to trade by comparing the execution costs of market orders and marketable imit 
orders (i.e., limit orders with the same trading priority as market orders). The results in- 
dicate the unconditional trading costs of marketable imit orders are significantly greater 
than market orders. We attribute the difference in costs to a selection bias and provide 
evidence suggesting the order submission strategy decision is based on prevailing market 
conditions and stock characteristics. After correcting for the selection bias, the results 
show the average trader chooses the order type with lower conditional trading costs. 
I. Introduction 
Investors face an order submission strategy decision every time they trade. 
They may submit market orders or, alternatively, limit orders. Each order type has 
advantages and disadvantages. A market order demands immediacy, requiring ex- 
ecution as soon as practicable, at the best available price. However, the execution 
price is uncertain at the time the order is submitted. This is particularly true, for 
example, when the order is for more than the quoted depth. Therefore, market or- 
der traders face some price risk. On the other hand, a limit order allows a trader to 
set a limit price at which the order might fill, but there is a risk the order does not 
execute. Understandably, order submission strategy is very important as traders 
in financial markets encounter the choice of order type hundreds of thousands of 
times per day. 
*Peterson, mapl @cba.siu.edu, Department of Finance, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 
IL 62901; Sirri, sirri@babson.edu, Finance Department, Babson College, Wellesley, MA 02157. We 
appreciate comments from Gordon Alexander, Scott Gilbert, Jeff Harris, Marc Lipson, Evren Ors, 
Venkatesh Panchapagesan, Robert Van Ness, and Larry Harris (the referee). Comments by seminar 
participants at the 2000 FMA Meetings, 2000 Nasdaq-Notre Dame Microstructure Conference, 2001 
Western Finance Association Meetings, 2000 NBER Market Microstructure Meeting, and Southern 
Illinois University are gratefully acknowledged. Parts of this work were completed when the authors 
were with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC, as a matter of policy, disclaims any 
responsibility for any private publication or statements by any of its employees. The views expressed 
herein are those of the authors' and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, or of 
the authors' former colleagues on the staff of the Commission. Any errors that may remain are our 
own. Peterson acknowledges financial support from the SIU College of Business Summer Scholars 
Program. 
221 
222 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
Microstructure research in modeling the trader's choice between market or- 
ders and limit orders has focused on the tradeoff between execution certainty and 
transactions costs (see, e.g., Cohen, et al. (1981), Harris (1997), Harris and Has- 
brouck (1996), Holden and Chakravarty (1995), and Kumar and Seppi (1992)). 
Among the important empirical results found in Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) 
are that limit orders perform better (based on their ex ante performance measure) 
and the limit order placement strategies most commonly used perform best. The 
results in Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) are conditioned on order size, bid-ask 
spread, and order direction, and assume traders using market orders and limit 
orders have the same level of commitment to trade. 
In this paper, we extend the work of Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) by inves- 
tigating order submission strategy of traders on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) with similar commitments to trade. In so doing, we compare the trading 
costs of market orders and marketable limit orders. A marketable limit order is a 
priced order with the limit price set at, or better than, the opposite side quote (bid 
price for sell orders and ask price for buy orders). Marketable limit orders have 
the same trading priority as market orders because the NYSE prioritizes orders on 
price. The only difference between a market order and a marketable limit order 
is the limit order has an execution price bounded by the limit price. Thus, this 
analysis provides insight into order submission strategy when price priority is not 
an issue. In this respect, our research allows us to investigate the benefits of one 
of the characteristics of limit orders, namely, a bounded execution price. 
Interestingly, previous studies including Angel (1997), Harris and Hasbrouck 
(1996), and SEC (1997) have identified significant differences in execution qual- 
ity between market and marketable limit orders. These studies indicate traders 
using the marketable limit order strategy pay greater trading costs. The results 
from these studies are persistent over time, as the trading costs have been calcu- 
lated using data from 1990 and 1996. Moreover, marketable limit orders appear 
to perform worse than market orders not only on the NYSE, but on the regional 
exchanges as well (SEC (1997)). These results are unexpected as there are no 
institutional reasons why the two order types should be treated differently. If dif- 
ferences in execution quality persist, the survivorship principle dictates investors 
must receive some other benefit from using marketable limit orders to offset in- 
creased execution costs. 
The data used in this study include order information (i.e., order type, buy/sell 
indicator) from the NYSE.1 Order data allow an accurate calculation of the rel- 
ative effective bid-ask spread. Similar to Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), who use 
data from 1990, we find market orders have lower unconditional trading costs 
than marketable limit orders. 
In an attempt to hold everything else equal, we condition our results on sev- 
eral dimensions, including current market conditions, stock characteristics, and 
investor type (i.e., individual or non-individual). Further, the choice of order type 
is not considered to be a random decision and, therefore, a potential selectivity 
bias exists. The Heckman (1979) two-step estimation technique is employed to 
I Data from the regional exchanges during an earlier time period were also analyzed. These results, 
available upon request, are qualitatively similar to those reported here. The NYSE-only sample is used 
because the data are more current and more comprehensive than the data from the regional exchanges. 
Peterson and Sirri 223 
deal with the selection bias. The results allow the estimation of the value, in 
terms of differential trading costs, of submitting a marketable limit order instead 
of a market order, under specified conditions. Other current research uses sim- 
ilar methodology. Madhavan and Cheng (1997) compare trades in the upstairs 
and downstairs markets, and Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (1999) compare trades 
from the floor to system entered trades. 
Our findings are consistent with investors selecting the order type based on 
current stock and market conditions, choosing the strategy minimizing trading 
costs. In particular, we show investors strategically place marketable limit orders 
to reduce price risk in cases when trading imbalances exist and the potential for 
receiving a fill at an unfavorable price increases. We find marketable limit or- 
ders are used proportionally more often: i) for larger orders, ii) by non-individual 
investors, iii) when the order size exceeds the quoted depth, iv) when quote imbal- 
ances exist, v) when the depth is relatively low, and vi) when spreads are narrow. 
Overall, the evidence indicates investors optimize their trading strategy where the 
type of order is an important consideration. We also show that, although the av- 
erage investor chooses an optimal trading strategy, there are cases when investors 
choose sub-optimal strategies. In general, we find evidence consistent with indi- 
vidual investors being less likely to choose optimal order submission strategies. 
II. Data Description 
Order data were obtained from the NYSE's System Order Database (SOD) 
for two weeks from June 30, 1997, to July 11, 1997. Hasbrouck (1992) describes 
the SOD file in detail. During this time period the minimum price variation, or 
tick, was $1/16 for most stocks. The analysis is conducted only for NYSE-listed 
issues of ordinary common shares as identified in the CRSP database. Orders 
entered outside of normal trading hours (9:30AM to 4:00PM EST) are excluded. 
This requirement is made because our cost estimator requires a benchmark quote. 
Opening orders, tick sensitive orders, market orders with price qualifiers, and limit 
orders that are not marketable are also excluded. As a result of these screens, we 
consider two types of orders: regular way market orders and marketable limit 
orders. Of the marketable limit orders, 91%, 6%, and 2% have a limit price equal 
to, $1/16 better than, and $1/8 better than the opposite side quote, respectively. 
We examined whether orders with the placement of the limit price beyond the 
market quote were any different from the rest of the limit orders. The results did 
not indicate these orders performed any differently. 
The SOD file is valuable because it includes comprehensive data on orders 
submitted through the NYSE's SuperDot system. Among other items, the SOD 
file includes information on the account type originating the order. This informa- 
tion is useful as one could determine whether the order originated from a member 
(as principal or agent), an individual investor, or any other customer including in- 
stitutions, non-member broker/dealers, and managed accounts. Despite its com- 
prehensive description of orders, the SOD file does not represent the entire picture 
of trading on the NYSE. Sofianos and Werner (2000) examine trading activity of 
NYSE floor brokers and find floor broker participation is as high as 44%. They 
conclude it is misleading to make inferences concerning liquidity using only SOD 
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and TAQ data. Ross, Shapiro, and Smith (1996) have reported over 80% of the 
NYSE orders, accounting for 30-40% of the volume, are executed through Su- 
perDOT. Hence, an important caveat should be considered at this point: order 
submission strategies described here apply to system orders sent to an auction 
market, not necessarily to orders or trades made by floor brokers, or orders sent 
to a dealer market such as Nasdaq. 
Benchmark quotes are required to accurately estimate transactions costs. 
Quotes are available from the TAQ database. The national best bid and offer 
(NBBO) were calculated at each point in time for all of the sample stocks over 
the sample period. If a stock traded in multiple markets and more than one market 
was at the best quote, the market with the highest depth was considered to have the 
best quote. The order data were then merged with quote data to create an obser- 
vation with all the required information. The order data include information such 
as the order arrival time, the size of the order, a buy/sell indicator, an indicator to 
identify market and limit orders, and limit order prices. Information on the exe- 
cution of the order includes the time of the execution, the execution price, and the 
fill quantity. For orders filled in more than one piece, the data contain information 
for each of the fills and a volume-weighted execution price is calculated. 
Many factors may jointly determine order submission strategy, including the 
size of the order and the level of investor sophistication. As the size of the or- 
der increases, the importance of the order type decision increases because any 
errors in order type selection will increase with order size. More sophisticated 
investors may more carefully consider the order type decision if they are able to 
recognize the marginal benefits from using an optimal order submission strategy. 
Therefore, throughout our analysis we categorize our results on these two poten- 
tial factors. Specifically, we categorize our results based on the relative order size, 
i.e., whether the order size is greater than the depth and by the account type as 
reported in the SOD ACCTYP field. The ACCTYP variable identifies whether 
the order originated from an individual investor's account as opposed to an order 
coming from an institution, managed account, or other proprietary account. We 
assume the level of investor sophistication may vary between individual investors 
and the complement set of investors (referred to here as non-individual investors). 
Table 1, panel A reports the number of orders. In all, we analyze 1,493,093 
orders of which 932,000 (62%) are market orders and 561,093 (38%) are mar- 
ketable limit orders. In general, the usage of limit orders increases (on a percent- 
age basis) with increases in order size. Small orders (100-500 shares), medium 
orders (501-5,000 shares), and large orders (> 5,000 shares) are marketable limit 
orders for 23%, 54%, and 73% of the observations, respectively. This result indi- 
cates order size is a determinant of order type selection. Further, marketable limit 
orders are used more frequently when the size of the order exceeds the current 
quoted depth as 34% of the orders with order size less than or equal to the op- 
posite side posted depth are marketable limit orders, but 58% of the orders with 
order size greater than the opposite side posted depth are marketable limit orders. 
However, this may be due to order size effects, rather than market depth effects. 
Many of the interesting patterns in Table 1, panel A also appear in panels 
B and C, which categorize orders as coming from individual investors or non- 
individual investors. We observe that individual investors tend to use market or- 
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TABLE 1 
Number of Orders 
All 
Order Size Number % Limit 
Panel A. All Orders 
Small 819,827 23% 
Medium 620,602 54% 
Large 52,664 73% 
All 1,493,093 38% 
Panel B. Orders from Non-Individual Investors 
Small 508,661 32% 
Medium 525,318 59% 
Large 48,828 74% 
All 1,082,807 47% 
Panel C. Orders from Individual Investors 
Small 311,166 8% 
Medium 95,284 25% 
Large 3,836 61% 
All 410,286 13% 
Order Size Order Size 
&lt; Depth > Depth 
Number % Limit Number % Limit 
792,555 
456,627 
21,002 
1,270,184 
487,329 
381,866 
19,413 
888,608 
305,226 
74,761 
1,589 
381,576 
23% 27,272 
52% 163,975 
74% 31,662 
34% 222,909 
31% 21,332 
58% 143,452 
75% 29,415 
44% 194,199 
8% 
22% 
56% 
11% 
5,940 
20,523 
2,247 
28,710 
38% 
58% 
73% 
58% 
45% 
61% 
74% 
61% 
13% 
33% 
64% 
31% 
Data are taken from the NYSE's System Order Database file over 6/30/97-7/11/97 and include orders 
from stocks identified in the CRSP names structure as ordinary common shares. Orders entered when 
the NBBO was unavailable, or when the NBBO was less than $1/16 or greater than $1/4 were excluded. 
Small orders are for 100-500 shares. Medium orders are for 501-5,000 shares. Large orders are for 
more than 5,000 shares. Order Size &lt; Depth refers to orders with size less than or equal to the opposite 
side posted depth. Order Size > Depth refers to orders with size greater than the opposite side posted 
depth. 
ders proportionally more than non-individuals. This result may be partially ex- 
plained by the fact that orders from individual investors tend to be smaller. This 
result may also suggest individual investors pursue different order submission 
strategies than non-individual investors or that individuals trade different stocks. 
The data in Table 1, taken together with models such as Easley and O'Hara (1987) 
where order size affects trading costs, are consistent with the marginal marketable 
limit order trader being more sophisticated than the marginal market order trader. 
If this conjecture is true, we should notice more evidence of order submission 
strategies for larger orders from non-individual investors. 
III. Empirical Analysis of Trading Costs, Market Liquidity, 
and Volatility 
A. Measurement of Trading Costs by Order Type 
The measure of execution costs we use is the relative effective spread defined 
as 
Relative effective spread = 2 x D x (P- MP)/MP, 
where D is the trade direction: 1 for buys, -1 for sells; P is the execution price 
(for orders with multiple fills we use the volume-weighted trade price); and MP is 
the midpoint of the quotes at the order arrival time. The relative effective spread 
represents the trading costs, on a percentage basis, less commissions. Order data 
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are critical to correctly identify the trade direction as the practice of price im- 
provement occurs frequently in order-driven markets such as the NYSE (Ross, 
Shapiro, and Smith (1996)). The use of these data is especially important be- 
cause more than 53% of the orders are submitted in minimum variation markets, 
situations in which one cannot detect price improvement, hence trade direction. 
In some cases, orders were not completely filled. Many of these orders were 
marketable limit orders cancelled shortly (within one minute) after order submis- 
sion. In such cases, we assigned a price equal to the weighted average of the 
current quote and the price one tick outside the quote, with the weight on the lat- 
ter being equal to the percent by which the order size exceeds the quoted size. 
Bacidore, Battalio, and Jennings ((2000), p. 14) note "the liquidity supply func- 
tion may be so steep or the order size so great that the order would execute at 
multiple prices outside the quote without floor intervention." If this is the case, 
then our execution cost estimator would underestimate the imputed cost of the 
order. On the other hand, the estimated execution, as described above, would 
not necessarily allow the order the opportunity of price improvement and, there- 
fore, may produce an imputed cost that would be overestimated. In any event, 
the occurrence of an unexecuted market or marketable limit order is rare, so any 
problem with imputing costs should be minimal. Indeed, similar results, available 
upon request, were found when unexecuted orders were excluded. 
Table 2 reports the average relative effective spreads.2 Panel A includes the 
results from all orders, regardless of investor type. Overall, the average relative 
effective spread for market orders is 0.240%; for marketable limit orders it is 
0.260%. The difference of 0.020% is statistically and economically significant, 
and is consistent with the studies previously cited. There appears to be a size 
effect as small (large) market orders are less (more) costly than small (large) mar- 
ketable limit orders. Not surprisingly, Table 2 also shows market orders have 
lower average relative effective spreads when the order size is less than or equal 
to the opposite side posted depth, although the difference in costs is economi- 
cally small. When the order size is more than the opposite side posted depth, 
marketable limit orders have lower average relative effective spreads. Panel B of 
Table 2 includes orders from non-individual investors accounts. For these orders, 
the patterns are very similar to the results summarized in panel A. 
Turning to Table 2, panel C, orders from individual investor accounts, we 
notice that, in general, the trading costs of the limit order strategy are significantly 
higher than the market order strategy. Interestingly, the differences are quite large 
economically, even for small orders for less than the quoted depth (-0.1%). We 
have no immediate explanation for this result as there may be characteristics other 
than order size and quoted depth that determine trading costs. Comparing the 
results in panel B to the results in panel C, the data seem to indicate individual 
investors pay higher trading costs than non-individual investors. However, under 
2Buy orders and sell orders were analyzed separately. However, because the relative effective 
spreads of buy orders were very similar to the relative effective spreads of sell orders, results are not 
reported separately to conserve space. 
Peterson and Sirri 227 
TABLE 2 
Average Relative Effective Spread (%) 
Order Size Order Size 
All &lt; Depth > Depth 
Order Size Market Limit Market Limit Market Limit 
Panel A. All Orders 
Small 0.199% 0.205%** 0.195% 0.201%** 0.315% 0.261%** 
Medium 0.321 0.269** 0.280 0.231** 0.449 0.363** 
Large 0.490 0.457** 0.448 0.343** 0.516 0.534 
All 0.240 0.260** 0.219 0.223** 0.431 0.386** 
Panel B. Orders from Non-Individual Investors 
Small 0.182% 0.187%** 0.178% 0.183%** 0.282% 0.248%** 
Medium 0.271 0.242** 0.227 0.203** 0.397 0.341** 
Large 0.433 0.418 0.350 0.298** 0.484 0.499 
All 0.220 0.237** 0.195 0.199** 0.388 0.362** 
Panel C. Orders from Individual Investors 
Small 0.219% 0.317%** 0.216% 0.313%** 0.389% 0.431%* 
Medium 0.471 0.617** 0.426 0.601** 0.659 0.656 
Large 0.963 1.066 1.128 1.078 0.823 1.059** 
All 0.273 0.487** 0.254 0.442** 0.595 0.701** 
Data are taken from the NYSE's System Order Database file over 6/30/97-7/11/97 and include orders from 
stocks identified in the CRSP names structure as ordinary common shares. The relative effective spread 
is calculated as 2 x D x (Price - Quote Midpoint)/Quote Midpoint, where D is 1 for buys and -1 for 
sells. The NBBO is measured at order arrival time. Orders entered when the NBBO was unavailable (e.g., 
the open) or was less than $1/16 or greater than $1/4 were excluded. Orders that are not completely 
filled have an imputed price of the opposite side quote for shares up to the current depth and $1/16 
more(less) for the remaining shares for buys(sells). Small orders are for 100-500 shares. Medium orders 
are for 501-5,000 shares. Large orders are for more than 5,000 shares. Order Size &lt; Depth refers to 
orders with size less than or equal to the opposite side posted depth. Order Size > Depth refers to 
orders with size greater than the opposite side posted depth. * and ** indicate the difference in relative 
effective spreads across order types is significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, using a t-test. 
closer inspection, we found individuals tend to trade lower priced, less liquid 
stocks than non-individuals.3 
To summarize the results in Table 2, we find the average marketable limit 
order trader incurs larger transactions costs. The difference in costs is related to 
order size, investor type, and the size of the order relative to the opposite side 
quoted depth. Additionally, although the average marketable limit order appears 
to be more expensive, these orders tend to be used more often (recall Table 1) 
when the average marketable limit order is less expensive than the average market 
order. 
B. Depth at the Quotes 
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) examine order flow on the Paris Bourse and 
provide results consistent with the presence of limit order traders monitoring the 
order book, competing to provide liquidity to the market when it is needed and 
rewarded, and quickly seizing favorable trading opportunities. For the orders in 
this study, which are orders entered through a computer system and not from the 
3In a previous draft, we tested whether individuals paid higher transactions costs, all else equal. 
We found the average marketable limit order submitted by individuals incurred additional costs rela- 
tive to orders from non-individuals of approximately 3d per round-trip, but market orders submitted 
by individuals incurred smaller costs relative to orders from non-individuals, on the order of approxi- 
mately 24 per round-trip. 
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floor, it is likely that quotations from the Consolidated Quotation System (CQS) 
are the primary source of current stock liquidity. The CQS quotes not only include 
prices, but also the number of shares honored at those prices. Investors who may 
otherwise choose to use a market order may choose to use a limit order if the 
quoted depth is relatively small. 
Table 3, panel A, reports the percentage of orders for which the number of 
shares is greater than the posted depth at the opposite side quote. For both indi- 
viduals and non-individuals, the percentage of marketable limit orders with the 
number of shares exceeding the quoted depth is significantly greater than the per- 
centage of market orders with the number of shares exceeding the quoted depth. 
This result is consistent with traders monitoring the quotes and using a marketable 
limit order strategy when there is a significant risk a part of the order might exe- 
cute at the next price step. This result is interesting because it is consistent with 
investors, including individual investors, using the quotes as an input into their 
order submission decision framework. 
Table 3, panel B includes another measure of depth, which we refer to as 
quote imbalance. The quote imbalance is defined as 
Imbalance = 2 x (Bid size - Ask size)/(Bid size + Ask size). 
TABLE 3 
Analysis of Depth at the Opposite Quote at Order Submission Time 
Non-Individual Individual 
Investors Investors 
Market Limit Market Limit 
Panel A. % Greater than Depth 
All orders 13% 23%** 5% 17%** 
Panel B. Median Imbalance 
Buy orders 
Small 0.00 0.71** -0.13 0.00** 
Medium 0.00 0.52** 0.00 0.03** 
Large -0.17 0.00** 0.00 0.00 
All 0.00 0.60** -0.11 0.00** 
Sell orders 
Small -0.14 -1.00** 0.00 -0.06** 
Medium -0.20 -0.73** 0.00 -0.21** 
Large 0.00 -0.25** 0.00 -0.16** 
All -0.17 -0.78** 0.00 -0.15** 
Panel C. Order Type Usage vs. Relative Depth 
Small depth 47% 53% 81% 19% 
Medium depth 55% 45% 82% 18% 
Large depth 61% 39% 83% 17% 
Data are taken from the NYSE's System Order Database file over 6/30/97-7/11/97, and include orders 
from stocks identified in the CRSP names structure as ordinary common shares. % Greater than Depth 
refers to orders submitted for more shares than are at the NBBO depth. Imbalance is calculated as 
2 x (Bid depth - Ask depth)/(Bid depth + Ask depth). Small orders are for 100-500 shares. Medium 
orders are for 501-5,000 shares. Large orders are for more than 5,000 shares. Order Type Usage vs. 
Relative Depth is the median percentage order type usage, across stocks, controlling for each stock's 
depth. Small depth indicates the depth for the lowest third of observations. Medium depth indicates 
the depth for the middle third of observations. Large depth indicates the depth for the highest third of 
observations. * and ** indicate the percentage of orders greater than the depth (imbalance) across order 
types is significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a binomial z-test (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test). 
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The data indicate marketable limit orders are used proportionally more often in 
the presence of a quote imbalance and market orders are used when the quoted 
depths are relatively even. For example, buy orders from non-individual investors 
have a median imbalance of 0.60 for marketable limit orders, but a median im- 
balance of 0.00 for market orders. These imbalances are significantly different at 
the 1% level using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The corresponding median im- 
balance for marketable limit sell orders from non-individuals is -0.78, but -0.17 
for market sell orders. One explanation for traders using marketable limit or- 
ders when imbalances exist is traders may believe the quotes are about to move. 
For buy orders, investors viewing the quoted depths and realizing the bid size is 
significantly greater than the ask size, might assume there are more buyers than 
sellers. Hence, they may believe the quotes move up. Traders, who otherwise 
might choose to use a market order, may choose a limit order so they eliminate 
the likelihood of executing at the next price step. 
Interestingly, it appears imbalance matters most for smaller orders. However, 
if one recognizes the frequency of limit order usage increases with order size, 
this result is not entirely unexpected. In other words, order size may dominate 
imbalance in determining order submission strategy. Overall, the data indicate as 
the bid depth exceeds the ask depth, limit orders are used more frequently for buy 
orders. The converse is true for sell orders. The same patterns exist for orders 
from individual investors. However, the level of quote imbalance is considerably 
smaller. 
In Table 3, panel C, we control for stock effects by examining order type 
selection conditioning on each stock's relative depth. For each stock we determine 
cutoff points for small, medium, and large depth by examining the distribution 
of trade-weighted quoted depths. Then, we calculate for each stock and level of 
depth, the percentage of limit order usage. The cross-sectional median percentage 
limit order usage is reported in the table. In general, limit order usage increases 
with a decrease in the relative depth. For non-individual investors, we note 53% 
of the orders submitted when the depth was small were marketable limit orders. 
But when the depth is relatively large, only 39% of the orders were marketable 
limit orders. As noted above, individual investors use marketable limit orders 
less frequently. Nevertheless, the pattern of increased limit order usage with a 
decrease in depth is similar to the pattern from non-individual investors. These 
data are consistent with traders monitoring the quotes and using this information 
in considering which order type to use. 
Figure 1, A and B, graphically summarizes the results in Table 3 by display- 
ing the frequency distribution of market and marketable limit order usage as a 
function of order size divided by the opposite side quoted depth. In Figure 1A, 
the distribution of order size divided by the depth is charted for orders from non- 
individual investors. More than 50% of market orders are for 20% or less of the 
posted depth. However, less than 25% of marketable limit orders are for 20% or 
less of the posted depth. Most interesting is the spike at one (order size equals the 
opposite side quoted depth). Approximately 24% of the marketable limit orders 
are for the posted depth and slightly more than 5% of the market orders are for 
the posted depth. These data, as above, are consistent with traders monitoring the 
posted depth. 
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FIGURE 1 
1A. Distribution of Order Size/Depth for Orders from Non-Individual Investors Accounts 
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Order Size / Depth 
Figure 1A displays the distribution of order size divided by the opposite side quoted depth for orders 
submitted from accounts identified as other than individuals for the sample of market and marketable 
limit orders described in Table 1. 
1B. Distribution of Order Size/Depth for Orders from Individual Investors Accounts 
40 
0 Market Orders 
* Marketable Limit Orders 
30 
20 - 
0' 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 >2 
Order Size / Depth 
Figure 1B displays the distribution of order size divided by the opposite side quoted depth for orders 
submitted from accounts identified as from individuals for the sample of market and marketable limit 
orders described in Table 1. 
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Figure lB plots the distribution of order size divided by the opposite side 
depth for orders from individual investors. Consistent with the results in Table 
3 and Figure 1A, the data indicate, although limit orders are used relatively in- 
frequently, they are used more often as the order size increases relative to the 
opposite side quote. There is also a spike, albeit not that large, at one, which is 
consistent with individual investors monitoring the quoted depth. 
C. Stock Volatility 
Harris (1997) derives optimal dynamic order submission strategies for trad- 
ing problems faced by three stylized traders. He finds traders are most aggressive 
when volatility is high and when their information advantages are large and de- 
cay quickly. Traders are patient when their deadlines are not pressing and when 
spreads are wide. Traders issue limit orders only if they can capture a portion of 
the spread. Harris' arguments suggest marketable limit orders will be used more 
often when spreads are narrow so as to gain price priority. Additionally, limit 
orders are predicted to be used more often in volatile markets. 
Because market order traders are subject to greater price risk than limit order 
traders, it may be that on more volatile trading days investors would tend to use 
marketable limit orders to mitigate this risk. We use two proxies for volatility. 
One proxy, hereafter referred to as short-run volatility, is defined as the squared 
log return from the opening trade to the quote midpoint at order submission time, 
multiplied by 10,000. The second proxy, hereafter referred to as long-run volatil- 
ity, is defined as the standard deviation of returns for the previous year for each 
stock. 
Table 4 presents the average volatility for market and marketable limit or- 
ders. Panel A reports the results for orders from non-individual investors. Re- 
gardless of order size and whether the order size exceeds the opposite side quoted 
depth, the average short-run volatility is typically higher for market orders than 
marketable limit orders. The average long-run volatility measure is higher for 
market orders when the order size is less than the depth, and approximately the 
same when the order size is greater than the depth. One interpretation of these 
results is that investors may choose the market order strategy more frequently in 
volatile markets because the likelihood of non-execution of marketable limit or- 
ders increases in such markets. Panel B reports the volatility results for orders 
from individual investors. For both volatility measures the average volatility is 
higher for marketable limit orders than market orders. 
Because the volatility measures in both panels are significantly different 
across order types, these data are consistent with traders considering the volatility 
of the underlying stock when making their order type decision. Another interest- 
ing observation is the average short-run volatility is higher for orders exceeding 
the opposite side quoted depth. This result is consistent with less depth on more 
volatile trading days. 
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TABLE 4 
Stock Volatility and Order Submission 
Order Size Order Size 
&lt; Depth > Depth 
Market Limit Market Limit 
Panel A. Orders from Non-Individual Investors 
Short-Run Volatility 
Small orders 2.65 2.36** 3.51 2.80** 
Medium orders 2.99 2.49** 3.17 3.01** 
Large orders 3.76 3.44 3.39 3.47 
All 2.77 2.47** 3.25 3.08** 
Long-Run Volatility ( x 100) 
Small orders 1.92 1.83** 1.90 1.84** 
Medium orders 2.03 1.90** 1.97 1.97 
Large orders 2.16 2.03** 2.07 2.09** 
All 1.96 1.88** 1.97 1.98** 
Panel B. Orders from Individual Investors 
Short-Run Volatility 
Small orders 2.74 4.24** 3.35 4.41* 
Medium orders 4.14 5.83** 4.20 8.09 
Large orders 9.11 7.29 4.77 19.32 
All 2.99 4.93** 4.00 9.56** 
Long-Run Volatility ( x 100) 
Small orders 2.03 2.21** 1.98 2.12** 
Medium orders 2.16 2.38** 2.08 2.22** 
Large orders 2.49 2.70 2.31 2.47** 
All 2.05 2.29** 2.07 2.25** 
Data are taken from the NYSE's System Order Database file over 6/30/97-7/11/97 and include orders 
from stocks identified in the CRSP names structure as ordinary common shares. Orders entered when 
the NBBO was unavailable (e.g., the open) or was less than $1/16 or greater than $1/4 were excluded. 
Small orders are for 100-500 shares. Medium orders are for 501-5,000 shares. Large orders are for 
more than 5,000 shares. Order Size &lt; Depth refers to orders with size less than or equal to the posted 
depth. Order Size > Depth refers to orders with size greater than the posted depth. The short-run 
volatility is defined as 10,000 x squared log return from the opening trade to the order submission time 
NBBO midpoint. The long-run volatility is the standard deviation of returns over the previous year for 
each stock. * and ** indicate the difference in volatility across order types is significant at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively, using a t-test. 
IV. Are Investors Pursuing Optimal Order Submission 
Strategies? 
Under the null hypothesis of no order submission strategy, the selection of 
order type is assumed to be random. To determine if investors are pursuing opti- 
mal order submission strategies then one need only compare the average trading 
costs for each strategy. However, Tables 1-4 indicate order submission strategy 
may not be random. This becomes an issue in assessing whether investors are pur- 
suing optimal order submission strategies for at least two reasons. First, the order 
type decision may be influenced by stock or market characteristics. Comparing 
the performance of each strategy under different circumstances may result in an 
unfair test of the performance of the two order types. Second, we would like to 
use a model to evaluate trading costs under each strategy. After fitting the model, 
the parameter estimates could be used to determine which order strategy is better, 
holding all else equal. However, if a selection bias exists, the parameter estimates 
of the model may be inconsistent. Using the inconsistent model, parameter es- 
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timates may result in false inferences on the estimates of trading costs using the 
alternate strategy. 
We use the method of matching and the Heckman two-step estimation to 
control for potential selection biases to ensure robustness of our results. The 
basic procedure is as follows. First, two subsamples are randomly formed. One 
subsample is used for parameter estimation and the other subsample is used for 
evaluation. A binomial probit modeling the choice of using the marketable limit 
order strategy is estimated. Next, the output from the probit is used to control for 
selectivity in estimating conditional trading costs as described below. 
A. Predicting Order Type Using the Probit Regression 
Relative effective spreads are modeled for market and marketable limit or- 
ders as4 
RELSPREADLimit = /Limit'X, + eLimit 
RELSPREADMarket = /Market'Xi + Market 
where Xi is a vector of conditioning variables for each order i, /3 is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated, and the es are error terms. We assume the difference 
in expected execution costs across order types is a factor that determines the order 
type selected by a trader. The difference in expected relative effective spreads is 
yi = E { RELSPREADLimit - RELSPREADMarket X.} 
= (oLimit -_ /Markett) X + Limit EMarket 
= 7Xi + (i. 
In this model, trader i chooses to submit a marketable limit order if y 7 &lt; 0, i.e., 
a marketable limit order strategy is expected to be less costly. The order type 
decision rule for an investor wishing to trade is 
Yi = 1 if y* &lt; 0, 
Yi = 0 ify7 > 0, 
with yi = 1 for a marketable limit order and Yi = 0 for a market order. 
We use several independent variables to model the choice of order type in a 
probit framework. Because the bid-ask spread may be an important determinant 
of order submission strategy, we include three binary variables to control for the 
size of bid-ask spread at order arrival (with the base case being defined as having 
the spread equal to $1/4). SprdEq$1/16 is a binary variable set to one if the bid- 
ask spread is $1/16 at order arrival, otherwise it is zero. SprdEq$1/8 is a binary 
variable set to one if the bid-ask spread is $1/8 at order arrival, otherwise it is 
zero. SprdEq$3/16 is a binary variable set to one if the bid-ask spread is $3/16 
at order arrival, otherwise it is zero. LogRelOrdSiz is the log of the order size 
divided by the opposite side quoted depth. SRVolatility and LRVolatility are the 
4The effective spread was also considered and results were similar. 
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Short-Run Volatility and the Long-Run Volatility, respectively, as defined above 
and in Table 4. Imbalance is the quote imbalance as described above and in Table 
3. To pool buy and sell orders in a single regression, Imbalance is multiplied by 
- 1 for sell orders. LogMktCap is the log of the market capitalization (in millions) 
of the underlying stock and is included to control for the liquidity of the stock. 
Buy is a dummy variable set to one if the order is a buy order, otherwise it is zero. 
Buy is included because buy orders may be more informative than sell orders for 
the reason that sell orders may include more liquidity motivated trades. 
Table 5 reports the results from the probit regression, estimating the proba- 
bility an investor chooses the marketable limit order strategy. That is, 
Pr{yi = 1} = ("(7tXi), 
where P is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. In general, 
the data support the univariate results. Likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the 
hypothesis the explanatory variables have zero coefficients. 
For orders from non-individual investors (panel A) and individual investors 
(panel B), the probit results indicate limit orders are used more when the spread at 
order submission is smaller.5 This result is consistent with Harris (1997). Limit 
orders appear to be used more often as the order size increases relative to the 
depth as the coefficient estimates on LogRelOrdSiz are all positive and signifi- 
cant. Depending on the investor type, LRVolatility is either positively related to 
or negatively related to the use of limit orders. These observations and the coef- 
ficient estimates on SRVolatility are consistent with Table 4. Buy orders tend to 
be limit orders more often than sell orders, which may result from the differential 
informativeness of buy orders vs. sell orders. Orders for more liquid stocks, as 
proxied by LogMktCap, tend to be market orders proportionally more often. 
The next step is to multiply the parameter estimates from the probit, 7, with 
the complementary set of observations, X, (i.e., the evaluation subsample) to esti- 
mate the probability of choosing a limit order ((-y'X)). 
B. Evaluating Conditional Execution Costs Using the Method of 
Matching 
The first method used to control for selectivity bias is the method of match- 
ing. The method of matching allows for a reduction in the selection bias as 
matches are constructed on the basis of observed characteristics, X. Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) have shown that if matching on X is valid, so is matching solely 
on the probability of selection. Thus, a multi-dimensional matching problem can 
be recast as a one-dimensional problem. This allows us to control for certain stock 
and market characteristics that may lead to a selection bias. 
In this approach, we average the relative effective spreads for each order type 
over an interval of ((-y'Xi) values. For more details on this procedure see Heck- 
man, Ichimura, and Todd (1997). Here, the predicted probabilities of selecting the 
limit order strategy, Pi(='i('yXi)), are ranked, forming 20 portfolios. Differences 
in transactions costs for each portfolio are tested for significance using a t-test. 
5In fact, 62%, 27%, 6%, and 4% of all marketable limit orders were placed when the spread was 
$1/16, $1/8, $3/16, and $1/4, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Probit (1st Stage) Regressions of Selecting a Marketable Limit Order 
Order Size &lt; Depth Order Size > Depth 
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard 
Coefficient Estimate Error Estimate Error 
Panel A. Orders from Non-Individual Investors 
Intercept -0.204** 0.012 -0.646** 0.023 
SprdEq$1/16 0.826** 0.009 0.750** 0.016 
SprdEq$1/8 0.453** 0.009 0.405** 0.017 
SprdEq$3/16 0.087** 0.011 0.001 0.020 
LogRelOrdSiz 0.383** 0.002 0.104** 0.005 
SRVolatility -0.000 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
LRVolatility -7.963** 0.264 -3.977** 0.542 
Imbalance 0.021** 0.002 0.009 0.005 
LogMktCap -0.034** 0.001 -0.063** 0.003 
Buy 0.078** 0.004 0.115** 0.008 
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.053 
Panel B. Orders from Individual Investors 
Intercept -2.029** 0.024 - 1.648** 0.061 
SprdEq$1/16 0.525** 0.017 0.472** 0.040 
SprdEq$1/8 0.313** 0.017 0.319** 0.041 
SprdEq$3/16 0.005 0.022 -0.010 0.051 
LogRelOrdSiz 0.137** 0.003 0.295** 0.016 
SRVolatility 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LRVolatility 6.919** 0.389 4.217** 1.075 
Imbalance -0.058** 0.004 -0.176** 0.013 
LogMktCap -0.102** 0.002 -0.092** 0.007 
Buy 0.040** 0.008 0.076** 0.023 
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.064 
The sample is described in Table 1. Parameter estimates are obtained using a random subsample of 
approximately half of all observations. SprdEq$1/16 is equal to 1 when the spread at order submission 
is $1/16, otherwise 0. SprdEq$1/8 is equal to 1 when the spread at order submission is $1/8, otherwise 
0. SprdEq$3/16 is equal to 1 when the spread at order submission is equal to $3/16, otherwise 0. 
LogRelOrdSiz is the log of the order size divided by the depth. SRVolatility is defined as 10,000 x 
squared log return from the opening trade to the order submission time NBBO midpoint. LRVolatility is 
the standard deviation of returns in the previous year. Imbalance is described in Table 3. For sell orders, 
Imbalance is multiplied by -1. LogMktCap is the log of the market capitalization in millions of dollars. 
Buy is a dummy variable set to 1 for buy orders, 0 otherwise. Order Size &lt; Depth refers to orders with 
size less than or equal to the opposite side posted depth. Order Size > Depth refers to orders with size 
greater than the opposite side posted depth. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Values indicated as 0.000 or -0.000 have been rounded to thousandths. 
Table 6 reports the average relative effective spread by order type for each 
probability portfolio. Panel A reports the results for the orders from non-individual 
investors. First, some observations regarding the orders for fewer shares than are 
displayed at the opposite side quote. For the orders least likely to be limit or- 
ders, portfolio 1, the average relative effective spread is 0.138% and 0.259% for 
market and marketable limit orders, respectively. The difference of 0.121% is sta- 
tistically significant at the 1% level. To put this number in dollar terms, given the 
average stock price on the NYSE in 1997 was $43.30 (source: NYSE Fact Book), 
the 0.121% difference represents an additional cost of about 5i on a round-trip. 
Therefore the difference in trading costs is economically significant as well. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the portfolio of orders most likely to be 
limit orders, portfolio 20, indicates market orders are more expensive (0.221% 
vs. 0.181%). The difference in relative effective spreads generally increases from 
portfolio 1 to portfolio 20. These data are consistent with the average market order 
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TABLE 6 
Relative Effective Spreads (%) for Portfolios Ranked on the Estimated Likelihood of Using a 
Limit Order Strategy 
Order Size &lt; Depth Order Size > Depth 
Portfolio Market Limit Difference Market Limit Difference 
Panel A. Orders from Non-Individual Investors 
1 (Least likely) 0.138% 0.259% 
2 0.161 0.256 
3 0.164 0.245 
4 0.175 0.226 
5 0.186 0.237 
6 0.193 0.238 
7 0.199 0.219 
8 0.210 0.201 
9 0.211 0.206 
10 0.221 0.219 
11 0.224 0.219 
12 0.220 0.218 
13 0.210 0.188 
14 0.213 0.162 
15 0.210 0.188 
16 0.219 0.190 
17 0.222 0.205 
18 0.212 0.175 
19 0.202 0.159 
20 (Most likely) 0.221 0.181 
Panel B. Orders from Individual Investors 
1 (Least likely) 0.092% 0.068% 
2 0.095 0.093 
3 0.110 0.122 
4 0.123 0.136 
5 0.135 0.116 
6 0.157 0.179 
7 0.169 0.201 
8 0.186 0.210 
9 0.208 0.262 
10 0.223 0.272 
11 0.238 0.287 
12 0.253 0.290 
13 0.274 0.327 
14 0.286 0.334 
15 0.307 0.347 
16 0.330 0.387 
17 0.351 0.435 
18 0.400 0.440 
19 0.477 0.533 
20 (Most likely) 1.006 1.178 
-0.121%** 0.241% 0.354% 
-0.095** 0.434 0.467 
-0.081** 0.560 0.550 
-0.051 ** 0.455 0.445 
-0.051** 0.348 0.341 
-0.045** 0.353 0.351 
-0.020** 0.366 0.369 
0.009 0.383 0.348 
0.005 0.378 0.327 
0.002 0.368 0.308 
0.005 0.320 0.280 
0.002 0.288 0.257 
0.022** 0.302 0.275 
0.051 ** 0.313 0.280 
0.022** 0.324 0.284 
0.029** 0.351 0.309 
0.017** 0.344 0.338 
0.037** 0.447 0.351 
0.043** 0.522 0.457 
0.040** 0.735 0.639 
0.004% 0.285% 0.260% 
0.002 0.381 0.330 
-0.012 0.387 0.293 
-0.013 0.433 0.462 
0.019 0.486 0.475 
-0.022 0.463 0.408 
-0.032** 0.475 0.412 
-0.024 0.546 0.457 
-0.054** 0.529 0.456 
-0.049** 0.514 0.480 
-0.049** 0.528 0.547 
-0.037** 0.616 0.538 
-0.053** 0.621 0.599 
-0.048** 0.655 0.627 
-0.040** 0.738 0.667 
-0.057** 0.648 0.699 
-0.084** 0.821 0.710 
-0.040* 0.840 0.813 
-0.056** 1.053 0.843 
-0.172** 1.637 1.547 
The spread is based on the NBBO at order arrival time. Data are taken from 6/30/97-7/11/97 and include 
only those shares in the CRSP names structure that are ordinary common shares. Parameter estimates 
are obtained using a random subsample of approximately half of all observations. The complementary 
subsample is used to form portfolios and calculate average relative effective spreads (in percent) used 
in this table. Order Size &lt; Depth refers to orders with size less than or equal to the posted depth. Order 
Size > Depth refers to orders with size greater than the posted depth. * and ** indicate the difference is 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a t-test. 
being less expensive when market orders are the primary order type, and with the 
average market order being more expensive when marketable limit orders are the 
primary order type. 
Consider next the orders for more shares than are at the posted depth. As 
above, the data indicate the difference in trading costs increases with the likeli- 
hood of limit order usage. With the exception of the two portfolios most likely to 
-0.083%** 
-0.033** 
0.010 
0.010 
0.007 
0.002 
-0.003 
0.035** 
0.051** 
0.060** 
0.040** 
0.031** 
0.027* 
0.033* 
0.040** 
0.042** 
0.006 
0.096** 
0.065** 
0.096** 
0.025% 
0.051 
0.094* 
-0.021 
0.011 
0.055 
0.063 
0.089 
0.073 
0.034 
-0.019 
0.078 
0.022 
0.028 
0.071 
-0.051 
0.111 
0.027 
0.210 
0.090 
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be market orders, these data are consistent with the marketable limit order strat- 
egy, on average, being superior when the order size exceeds the quoted depth. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results for orders from individual investors. 
Surprisingly, it appears marketable limit orders are, in general, more expensive 
than market orders when the order size is less than or equal to the opposite side 
quoted depth. Notably, costs diverge as the likelihood of a marketable limit order 
submission increases. These results are inconsistent with the average individual 
investor benefiting (in terms of lower trading costs) from using the marketable 
limit order strategy. Alternatively, it may be that our probit model is mis-specified 
due to omitted variables. For example, commissions may vary across order types 
for individual investors, but we cannot observe this variable. When the order 
size is greater than the depth, the data do not generally reveal significant cost 
differences across order types. 
C. Estimating Conditional Execution Costs Using the Heckman Method 
The Heckman (1979) method is commonly used to handle selection bias 
problems. In the second stage of this method, the probit probability estimates 
are used to control for the selection bias. We wish to use this method for two 
reasons. First, we would like to be able to statistically confirm the existence of 
the apparent selection bias. The Heckman method can detect such a bias in a 
rather straightforward fashion. Thus, this method allows for a robustness check. 
Second, we would like to use the model to estimate trading costs under the current 
and alternate strategies. The Heckman method provides consistent parameters in 
our cost model described below. These parameters can be used to examine the 
tradeoffs in order submission strategies, something that cannot be done without 
the correction for selectivity. 
Because limit orders are observed only when y* < 0, the error term PLimit 
does not have a zero mean, conditional on being a limit order. The conditional 
expected trading costs for marketable limit orders and market orders are denoted 
as 
E { RELSPREADLimitj y* < 0} = PLim Limit i + t [ ( YXi)/ (/P Xi)] 
E {RELSPREADMarket y* > } = /Market'X 
+ AMarket [ (y'X)i) / ( (-YXi) - 1)], 
where (^y'Xi) and (7y'Xi) are, respectively, the density and cumulative distri- 
bution function of the standard normal evaluated at y 'Xi, and A is the covariance 
between Ei and (i. In this methodology, estimating the second stage equation by 
OLS provides consistent estimates of the parameters. The estimated coefficient of 
the selectivity variable, A, provides useful information about the extent to which 
the order type selection and execution costs are interrelated. This regression pro- 
vides an opportunity to test the null hypothesis that there is no order submission 
strategy, i.e., A = 0. Greene (1981) notes there is a problem with this estimation 
procedure as the standard errors in the second stage may be incorrect since the 
selectivity variables are themselves estimates. Greene (1981) outlines methods to 
correct this problem. 
238 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
Table 7 provides the second-step OLS estimates of the parameters with the 
relative effective spread as the dependent variable. Panel A presents results for or- 
ders from non-individual investors. When the order size is less than or equal to the 
opposite side depth, the coefficient estimate on the selectivity variable, Lambda, 
is insignificant for marketable limit orders and positive for market orders. We 
interpret his result in the following way. Marketable limit order traders, holding 
all else equal, would not incur higher costs by switching order types. However, 
arbitrarily choosing the market order strategy, without regard to the underlying 
stock or market conditions, would, on average, result in a higher relative effective 
spread as the likelihood of a marketable limit order submission increases. 
TABLE 7
OLS (Second Stage) Regressions Controlling for Selection Bias 
Panel A. Orders from Non-Individual Investors 
Order Size &lt; Depth Order Size > Depth 
Marketable Limit Order Market Order Marketable Limit Order Market Order 
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error 
Parameter (x 1000) (x 1000) (x 1000) (x 1000) (x 1000) (x 1000) (x 1000) (x 1000) 
Intercept -2.40** 0.25 -1.60** 0.11 1.45** 2.33 3.40** 1.03 
SprdEq$1/16 -1.71** 0.14 -0.12 0.07 -9.54** 0.89 7.52** 1.37 
SprdEq$1/8 -1.14** 0.09 -0.33** 0.04 -5.68** 0.51 3.66** 0.71 
SprdEq$3/16 -0.67** 0.05 -0.60* 0.04 -0.86** 0.11 -0.96** 0.10 
LogRelOrdSiz -0.10 0.06 0.32** 0.03 -0.20 0.11 2.16** 0.20 
SRVolatility 0.04** 0.00 -0.07** 0.00 0.06** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 
LRVolatility 80.67** 1.61 81.68** 1.20 151.38** 4.85 20.68** 8.10 
Imbalance 0.21** 0.01 0.44** 0.01 0.08** 0.02 0.38** 0.03 
LogMktCap -0.82** 0.01 -0.80** 0.01 -0.64** 0.07 -2.03** 0.12 
Buy 0.01 0.02 0.18** 0.02 -0.96** 0.13 1.52** 0.22 
Lambda -0.06 0.26 1.51** 0.14 -15.51* 1.99 18.70** 2.75 
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.18 0.30 0.26 
F-Value 10,490** 5,512** 2,490** 1,272** 
Panel B. Orders from Individual Investors 
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error 
Parameter (x 100) (x 100) (x 100) (x 100) (x 100) (x 100) (x 100) (x 100) 
Intercept -52.05** 1.32 -0.41** 0.01 -22.69** 2.11 -0.66** 0.05 
SprdEq$1/16 9.00** 0.24 -0.68** 0.01 3.27** 0.37 -1.95** 0.10 
SprdEq$1/8 5.29'* 0.15 -0.43** 0.01 2.14** 0.26 -1.33** 0.07 
SprdEq$3/16 -0.14** 0.04 -0.10** 0.01 -0.24** 0.09 -0.24** 0.03 
LogRelOrdSiz 2.37** 0.06 -0.18** 0.00 2.32** 0.22 -0.85** 0.07 
SRVolatility 0.03** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LRVolatility 139.75** 3.07 -1.20** 0.20 69.27** 3.45 4.81** 1.29 
Imbalance -0.91** 0.03 0.14** 0.00 -1.31** 0.13 0.65** 0.04 
LogMktCap - 1.96** 0.05 0.02** 0.00 -0.93** 0.07 0.12** 0.02 
Buy 0.81** 0.02 -0.04** 0.00 0.65** 0.07 -0.24** 0.02 
Lambda 21.58** 0.56 -4.24** 0.06 10.79** 1.08 -7.02** 0.42 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.21 0.37 0.28 
F-Value 924** 4,324** 266** 374** 
The sample is described in Table 1. Parameter estimates are obtained using a random subsample of approximately half 
of all observations. SprdEq$1/16 is equal to 1 when the spread at order submission is $1/16, otherwise 0. SprdEq$1/8 is 
equal to 1 when the spread at order submission is $1/8, otherwise 0. SprdEq$3/16 is equal to 1 when the spread at order 
submission is equal to $3/16, otherwise 0. LogRelOrdSiz is the log of the order size divided by the depth. SRVolatility is the 
range of stock prices for the current day. LRVolatility is the standard deviation of returns in the previous year. Imbalance 
is described in Table 3. For sell orders, Imbalance is multiplied by -1. LogMktCap is the log of the market capitalization 
in millions of dollars. Buy is a dummy variable set to 1 for buy orders, 0 otherwise. Order Size &lt; Depth refers to orders 
with size less than or equal to the posted depth. Order Size > Depth refers to orders with size greater than the posted 
depth. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Values indicated as 0.00 or -0.00 have been 
rounded to hundredths. 
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For the marketable limit order regression when the order size is for more 
shares than are at the opposite side quoted depth, Lambda is significantly less 
than zero, indicating relative costs decrease with increases in the likelihood of 
choosing a marketable limit order. The opposite is true for the market order re- 
gression. That is, relative costs of market orders increase with increases in the 
likelihood of choosing a marketable limit order. 
Table 7, panel B, provides the results for the orders from individual investors. 
The coefficient estimates on Lambda are all significant, indicating a selection bias 
is present. However, the signs are generally opposite of the same variable in panel 
A. These results are generally consistent with those in Table 6, panel B, and 
show the marketable limit order strategy is more expensive, holding the selected 
variables constant. 
V. The Impact of Switching Strategies 
The parameters from the second stage regressions are next used to estimate 
the trading costs of the observations in the evaluation subsample for the selected 
order submission strategy and the alternate order submission strategy. Each ob- 
servation in the evaluation subsample is multiplied by the appropriate market and 
marketable limit parameter vectors reported in Table 7. The products provide esti- 
mated relative effective spreads for the selected strategy and the alternate strategy. 
Table 8 reports the average estimated costs of the selected and alternate 
strategies, as well as the impact of switching order types. Regardless of investor 
type, the average trader chooses the less costly strategy when the order size is less 
than the depth. For example, non-individual investors submitting orders for fewer 
shares than are at the opposite side quoted depth, pay an average estimated rela- 
tive effective spread of 0.196%. Using the alternate strategy, the average estimated 
relative effective spread is 0.212%. The difference of 0.016% is statistically sig- 
nificant. One could debate whether that amount is economically significant. For 
a 1,000 share order of a stock priced at $50, the difference would amount to $8. 
This difference may be smaller than the difference in commissions for submitting 
a market or a limit order. However, we should point out the differences reported 
are averages. In some cases, the marginal costs of choosing the alternate order 
type could be substantially greater. When the order size exceeds the opposite 
side quoted depth, the average non-individual trader chooses the less costly or- 
der type. In the same situation, the average individual investor chooses the more 
costly order type. However, the difference of 0.006% is quite small economically. 
This methodology also allows us to examine specific cases in which a sub- 
optimal order submission strategy was used. For example, Table 8 shows trades 
from non-individual investors self-selected to use the market order strategy when 
the order size was greater than the opposite side quoted depth paid, on average, 
0.023% higher transactions costs. This difference is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. To further investigate the orders that presumably used sub-optimal 
strategies, we examined those orders in which our model predicted relative effec- 
tive spreads to be at least 0.1% cheaper using the alternate strategy. We found ap- 
proximately 9% of the orders met this condition. Of these orders, approximately 
18% came from non-individual investor accounts and 82% came from individual 
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TABLE 8 
Average Impact on Relative Effective Spread (%) of Switching Order Submission Strategy 
Orders from Orders from 
Non-Individual Investors Individual Investors 
Order Size 
&lt; Depth > Depth &lt; Depth > Depth 
All Orders 
Selected 0.196% 0.370% 0.280% 0.637% 
Alternative 0.212 0.384 0.311 0.631 
Difference -0.016** -0.014** -0.031** 0.006** 
Self-Selected Marketable Limit Orders 
Selected 0.199 0.361 0.459 0.717 
Alternative 0.208 0.399 0.400 0.796 
Difference -0.009** -0.038** 0.059** -0.079** 
Self-Selected Market Orders 
Selected 0.195 0.384 0.257 0.601 
Alternative 0.216 0.361 0.300 0.556 
Difference -0.021** 0.023** -0.043** 0.045** 
The sample is described in Table 1. Probit and OLS parameter estimates are obtained using a random 
subsample of approximately half of all observations. The complementary subsample is used to form 
portfolios (using the probit estimates) and calculate estimated relative effective spreads (using the OLS 
estimates) using the selected strategy and the alternate strategy. Order Size &lt; Depth refers to orders 
with size less than or equal to the posted depth. Order Size > Depth refers to orders with size greater 
than the posted depth. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
investor accounts. Because the number of orders from non-individual investors is 
2.6 times the number of orders from individual investors (see Table 1), it may be 
better to report the likelihood of using the sub-optimal strategy. From this per- 
spective, 2% (25%) of the orders from non-individual (individual) investors use 
a sub-optimal strategy. In summary, individual investors tend to use sub-optimal 
strategies more often than non-individuals. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper addresses a result that has persisted over time and is found on 
multiple stock exchanges. That is, unconditionally, marketable limit orders per- 
form worse than market orders on a trading cost basis. Interestingly, the mar- 
ketable limit order strategy continues to be used. We show investors self-select 
the order type based on current market conditions. Marketable limit orders are 
used more often for larger orders and instances where an order imbalance exists. 
After correcting for the selectivity bias, we find the average investor strategically 
selects the order type with lower expected trading costs. We provide evidence 
suggesting investors would not, on average, achieve better performance, and may 
achieve worse performance, if they arbitrarily switched order types. Additionally, 
we find data consistent with individual investors being less able to choose optimal 
strategies. However, this result may be due to an omitted variable effect. 
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